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Abstract: Arvid Pardo was Malta’s permanent representative to the UN General Assembly 
(1964–71). This paper highlights Pardo’s work as a diplomat who had a vision of changing 
the way mankind takes care of its natural resources. Even though he is known as the Father 
of the Law of the Sea, the paper will show that the philosophical notions that were at the 
basis of the concept of common heritage of mankind were set aside for political reasons 
with the 1994 Implementation Agreement. This was unfortunate and, at the end of the paper, 
I question whether the migration crisis which has hit the Mediterranean could have been 
avoided if the developing countries had listened to Pardo way back in the 1970s.
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On 17 August 1967 Malta’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, submitted a request for the inclusion of a note verbale1 as a supplementary item on the agenda of the 
22nd session of the General Assembly. The initiative requested the 
General Assembly to consider the formulation of an international treaty 
and an international agency to regulate activities on the deep seabed,2 
to regulate activities there by establishing it as the common heritage 
of mankind. An international agency was to assume jurisdiction over 
the deep seabed, regulate and control activities undertaken on it and 
enforce the treaty.
The request was accepted and, on 1 November 1967, Pardo spoke 
eloquently for over three hours on the necessity of establishing a new 
1 Note Verbale by Arvid Pardo to the Secretary-General, 22nd Sess., Annex, Mem., UN Doc. 
A/6695 (17 August 1967) (Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda 
of the Twenty-Second Session).
2 Jack Barkenbus, Deep Seabed Resources: Politics and Technology (New York, 1979) 32–3.
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international regime for the management of the natural resources of our 
planet that was to challenge the very foundations of economic thinking 
and international law.3 Pardo was concerned that the world’s seabeds and 
much of the ocean floor were subject to exploitation by those countries 
that had the technology to do so,4 which mean that those countries that 
did not have this technology would end up with nothing. Pardo was 
personally convinced that the natural resources5 on the seabed and 
ocean floor were so plentiful that their exploitation by the developing 
countries could help bridge the gap between the North and the South.6 
This was a golden opportunity for mankind to use the natural resources 
of the planet in a way that everyone would benefit from them. Pardo’s 
proposal to the United Nations was that all humanity would take it 
upon itself to create the conditions necessary for the exploitation of the 
seabed and ocean floor for the benefit of all mankind and set a precedent 
that would make it contingent on mankind to make the preservation of 
the conditions necessary for the continued existence of humanity, the 
primary objective of responsibility.7
Pardo’s ideas on the common good had been advocated by Pope 
John XXIII in 1963 with his unexpected encyclical Pacem in Terris 
and a book he had read, John L. Mero’s The Mineral Resources of 
the Sea (Amsterdam, 1965), which made him realize that the seabed 
was the only remaining, untapped resource in the world which, as yet, 
remained unclaimed. The encyclical’s social thinking caused political 
reverberations that no one expected. In a sense, John XXIII’s reflections 
on the common good anticipated the kind of world ethic that Pardo 
thought necessary if the concept of common heritage of mankind was 
to make a difference on the world scene: 
In the second place, the very nature of the common good requires that all members of 
the state be entitled to share in it, although in different ways according to each one’s 
3 Address by Arvid Pardo to the 22nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(1967), Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Second Session, Agenda Item 
92, Document A/6695.
4 Barkenbus, 33.
5 Manganese nodules have been found in all oceans and estimates of their aggregate weight 
runs into trillions of tons.
6 Arvid Pardo, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Selected Papers on Oceans and World 
Order 1967–1974 (Malta, 1975), 2.
7 Pardo’s proposal is reflected in the Declaration of the Principles Governing the Seabed and 
the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, adopt-
ed by the UN General Assembly at its 25th Session on 17 December 1970.
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tasks, merits, and circumstances. For this reason, every civil authority must take pains 
to promote the common good of all, without preference for any single citizen or civic 
group. As Our Predecessor of immortal memory, Leo XIII, has said: ‘The civil power 
must not serve the advantage of any one individual, or some few persons, in as much 
as it was established for the common good of all’. Considerations of justice and equity, 
however, can at times demand that those involved in civil government give more 
attention to the less fortunate members of the community, since they are less able to 
defend their rights and to assert their legitimate claims.8
With the encyclical, John XXIII wanted to advise world leaders that, 
as the world was becoming increasingly interdependent and global, 
the common good of humanity could only be achieved if there was 
international cooperation. For John XXIII, a universal common good 
could only be advanced by an international authority, established by the 
consent of nations rather than by coercion.
According to Daniel Massa, in his book PSI KINGMAKER, Dr 
George Borg Olivier, prime minister of Malta, had asked Fr Peter 
Serracino Inglott who was teaching philosophy at the University of 
Malta, what kind of peace initiative Malta could take in the United 
Nations, to promote peace. Fr Peter found it very difficult to come up 
with any concrete proposal but things changed when Pardo, charged 
with a prophetic visio to make the undersea resources a common 
heritage of mankind, began sending to Malta, draft proposals, memos, 
and other dossiers for Borg Olivier to see. He soon realized that Pardo’s 
initiative could very much be the kind of proposal that Borg Olivier had 
intended for Malta:
So Borg Olivier had previously asked me what a small nation like Malta could do 
specifically for peace. Suddenly while Pardo was thinking of the universal profit to 
be got from the seabed for nations most in economic need, I was thinking how we 
could apply Pope John XXIII’s ideas for peace – and the concept of common good 
in the cause of peace. The conclusion was clear – that we should propose that certain 
resources such as those of the seabed (but even more clearly others like knowledge 
itself) be declared to belong to the common heritage of mankind.9
8 Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, 1963. <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/
encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html> [accessed on 15 Sep-
tember 2007]
9 Daniel Massa, PSI KINGMAKER (Malta, 2013), 292.
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Pardo was concerned that there was no well-defined legal framework 
that could prevent this unfair exploitation of natural resources because the 
high seas were still subject to the laissez faire laissez passer attitude of 
Grotius’ Mare Liberum10 which allowed the developed countries to exploit 
the deep seabed and ocean floor once they had the technology to do so.
Pardo wanted the world’s seabeds and the ocean floor to be 
exploited under international auspices for the benefit of the whole of 
mankind rather than by a few countries for the benefit of the few.11 For 
these reasons and with the support of the Maltese government, Pardo 
employed the phrase common heritage of mankind which implied that 
no state could appropriate these natural resources because they belonged 
to all of humanity, those living and also those who still had to be born.12 
Arvid Pardo, in his speech to the General Assembly, specifically 
avoided referring to these natural resources as belonging to the whole 
of mankind. What Pardo had in mind, and it was in this formulation 
that he was prophetic, was a new concept of the use of property that 
was not in any way related to appropriation. His was a new vision 
of resource management where these common resources would not 
be subject to appropriation of any kind, public or private, national or 
corporate. Sovereignty would be absent as would all legal attributes 
and ramifications.13 The notion that the deep sea and ocean resources 
were the legacy of humanity had already been expressed by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966 but Pardo’s idea of common heritage of 
mankind was diametrically opposed to that of President Johnson’s. In 
1966, at the inauguration of the Oceanographer, Lyndon had said, to 
the surprise of many, that, ‘we must ensure that the deep seas and the 
ocean bottom are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings’.14 The 
US Ambassador to the UN General Assembly, James Roosevelt, had 
10 Hugo Grotius was a Dutch legal scholar whose Mare Liberum (1609) promoted the idea that 
seas should be free for innocent use and benefit of all.
11 Interim Report on the United Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources, by United 
States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Orga-
nizations, 90th Congress, First Session, 7 December 1967, 277.
12 Pardo did not coin the term ‘common heritage of mankind’ which had already been used 
by Ambassador A.A. Cocca who was one of the prominent figures in the discussions on the 
common heritage of mankind and President Johnson.  
13 Christopher C. Joynor, ‘Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Man-
kind’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 35 (1986), 191.
14 Address given by President Johnson at the commissioning of the vessel, U.S. NOAA Ocean-
ographer, 13 July 1966.
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already hinted at this proposal in 1965 when he suggested that, since 
the UN had the willingness and ability to organize the emerging sector 
of deep ocean mining of the seabed natural resources, huge sums of 
money were needed to be allocated for this research:
Just as we believe that the assets which may accrue to man from the exploration of outer 
space should be shared universally, so we believe that what he finds beneath the sea 
may be used for international benefit – without infringing on the sovereignty rights of 
nations … The supply of mineral deposits, deep in the ocean … is virtually endless and 
it is not too early for this committee to start dreaming and thinking exciting thoughts 
about the role the UN can take.15
These resources had been discovered in the 1870s by the British 
expedition of the HMS Challenger which identified potato-sized 
manganese nodules scattered across large areas of the seabed at depths 
of around 3,500 metres.16 Then in 1958 the Convention of Geneva on 
the Law of the Sea declared that the coastal states had the sovereign 
right to exploit and explore the resources of the continental shelf as long 
as these resources were to be found in depths of 200 metres or less and 
that they were indeed exploitable. 
Pardo was not pleased with these events because the Geneva 
Convention allowed a coastal state to divide its resources with 
another coastal state on the opposite side of the sea. This meant that 
the technologically advanced countries, with the capability to exploit 
these resources, would have exclusive rights to do so.17 So, the Geneva 
Convention would lead to a situation where the developed countries 
would unilaterally exploit the largest mineral deposits on the planet!18 
This would also mean that the less technologically advanced countries 
would not be able to do so in the future when they would have 
appropriate technology for this endeavour.19 
Paradoxically, it was an attempt to keep the high seas free for 
navigation and fair trading that made possible this ambivalent situation 
15 Massa, 290.
16 Barkenbus, 4.
17 Pardo, 31.
18 Barkenbus,, 5.
19 Ida Ryuichi, ‘Human Genome as Common Heritage of Mankind – with a Proposal’, Bio-
ethics in Asia, 1.8 (1997); <http://www.eubios.info/ASIAE/BIAE59.htm> [accessed on 28 
January 2000]  
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where stronger nations could monopolize the high seas for their 
personal gain and exclude other nations from their share of the prize. 
The occasion was the seizure, on 25 February 1603, of a richly laden 
Portuguese galleon by a Dutch admiral employed by the Dutch East 
India Company (VOC) in the straits of Malacca as a form of protest 
against the decision of Spain and Portugal to exclude all foreigners 
from navigating the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The VOC had only 
been formed a year before in 1602 and the exclusion policy of Spain 
and Portugal was preventing it from doing trade with the East.20 Eager 
to convince its potential allies of its justification for abducting the 
Portuguese galleon and the reasons why it took such a drastic form of 
action, the VOC appointed Hugo Grotius to write a defence in which he 
would do just this. 
Grotius was immediately aware that his brief would have very 
serious implications for the freedom of navigation and more so, for 
the freedom of trade.21 As a legal basis for his defence, Grotius turned 
to natural law as opposed to the man-made laws of a specific nation 
or jurisdiction. Choosing the Tribunal of Conscience and the Tribunal 
of Public Opinion as pillars for his defence, he made it clear that the 
laws of nature written in the minds and hearts of every individual are 
immutable and universally given.22 To set the tone for his brief with the 
serious political and economic implications it carried, Grotius began his 
defence by stating:
To this tribunal we bring a new case. It is in very truth no petty case such as private 
citizens are wont to bring against their neighbours about dripping eaves or party walls; 
nor is it a case such as nations bring against one another about boundary lines or the 
possession of a river or an island. No! It is a case which concerns practically the entire 
expanse of the high sea, the right of navigation, the freedom of trade! Between us and 
the Spaniards the following points are in dispute: Can the vast, boundless sea be the 
appendage of one kingdom alone and it not the greatest? Can any one nation have 
the right to prevent other nations which so desire, from selling to one another, from 
20 Jasper A. Bovenberg, Property Rights in Blood, Genes and Data: Naturally Yours? (Leiden, 
2006), 37.
21 Ibid., 37–8.
22 Hugo Grotius, Freedom of the Seas: The Right of the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian 
Trade, trans. by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin (New York, 1916); 6. http://www.oll.liberty-
fund.org/EBOOKS/Grotius_0049.pdf> [accessed on 22 August 2006]  
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bartering with one another, actually from communicating with one another? Can any 
nation give away what it never owned, or discover what already belonged to some one 
else? 23
Grotius based his defence for the freedom of the seas and the right to 
free trade on the distinction, in Roman Law, between two forms of legal 
ownership, res nullius24 and res communis.25 The question for Grotius 
was whether the sea was res nullius or res communis? Res nullius 
referred to those territories and resources that as such belonged to no one 
by default because no one would have as yet appropriated them or laid 
claim to them. Legally, however, these territories and resources could 
be appropriated or exploited by a recognized sovereign if sovereignty 
or possession could be demonstrated and performed through discovery 
and effective occupation.26 Once this process was fulfilled territories or 
resources formerly regarded as res nullius could become transformed 
legally into territory subject to the exclusive ownership or jurisdiction 
of the sovereign who would have started the process in the first place.27 
With res communis the situation is totally different because in this 
case the territories or resources held in common possession could 
never become appropriated or laid claim to because they had to remain 
available for use by everyone. Hence these territories were not and 
could never be subject to sovereign claims of appropriation.28
By drawing on this distinction between res nullius and res communis 
and how land or resources in the former type of ownership can be 
subject to appropriation but not in the latter case, Grotius comes to 
the conclusion that the sea, which as yet had never been the subject of 
appropriation, was, by default, res communis and therefore the claim of 
Spain and Portugal for exclusive right to the Pacific and Indian Oceans 
was illegal. His views echoed the position of the second-century AD 
23 Ibid., 5.
24 Ibid., 13.
25 Ibid.
26 The Institutes of Justinian, trans. by John Thomas Abdy and Bryan Walker (Cambridge, 
1876), 82–5.  [Inst. Iust. 2.1.12-18 (De Rerum Divisione)]; <http://www.archive.org/details/
institutesofjust00abdyuoft> [accessed on 11 April 2004]
27 Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 15 vols (Washington D.C. 1963–73), 
II (1963), 1030–232.
28 Pilar N.Ossorio, ‘The Human Genome as Common Heritage: Common Sense or Legal’, The 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics of the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 
35:3 (2007), 425–39.
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Roman jurist Marcianus who wrote that the sea, its fish and even coastal 
waters were communis omnium naturali jure and so ‘common or open 
to all men by the operation of natural law’.29
However, Grotius did not exclude the possibility that part of the res 
communis can, in actual fact, become subject to private appropriation, as 
long as the occupation or appropriation is conditional to two fundamental 
imperatives, namely that the said occupation or appropriation does not 
impair its common use and that, if necessity dictates, what is private will 
become common again. He gives as examples what happens on board a 
ship when, if food becomes scarce, it is gathered in common, and how 
the Romans, despite allowing their subjects to occupy the shoreline, 
denied them the right to prevent anyone from accessing the shoreline 
and doing what was traditionally considered permissible.30 
In conclusion, Grotius makes it clear that Spain and Portugal were 
wrong in their claim to exclude foreigners from navigating the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans because the sea was res communis omnium,31 meaning, 
for the common use of all and so it had to remain. The problem was that 
as long as the legal framework related to the high seas was primarily 
concerned with ensuring freedom of navigation and freedom of trade, 
there was very little concern for disputes between countries related to 
the use of the high seas. In fact, Grotius’ Mare Liberum encouraged 
a laisser faire, laissez passer attitude that did not pose any serious 
international problems for over three centuries after its publication. 
It was only when the Challenger32 expedition found the manganese 
nodules in 1873 and US President Harry S. Truman declared, in 1945, 
that the US had a claim to the natural resources of the seabed of the 
continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the US, that trouble 
started.33 Mexico, Panama, Argentina, Peru, and many other nations 
made similar claims for extension of sovereignty over the continental 
shelf and its resources. The first conflicts involved coastal states and 
distant-water fishermen over coastal fish stocks. In 1954, a fishing 
fleet belonging to the magnate Aristotle Onassis was captured after the 
29 Arvid Pardo, ‘The Law of the Sea: Its Past and Its Future’, Oregon Law Review, 63:1 (1984), 
7–17.
30 Bovenberg, 55.
31 Abdy,78–80.
32 Pardo, The Common Heritage of Mankind, 7.
33 Ibid., 18–19.
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Peruvian authorities opened fire on the fleet. The fleet which included a 
factory ship was flying the Panamanian flag and the incident took place 
300 miles off the coast of Peru. A fine of over $3 million had to be paid 
to have the boats returned.34 
When Arvid Pardo put the concept of common heritage of mankind 
on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, he knew that it would not 
be easy to convince the industrialized member states of the political 
implications of the new regime of resource management that he was 
proposing. Chief among these political implications would be the 
establishment of an international authority that would manage the 
peaceful use and orderly exploitation of the deep seabed resources in 
the interests of mankind with special regard being given to the needs of 
poor countries. The same international authority would be expected to 
guarantee freedom of research with the results being made freely available 
to all those who showed interest in the research. But, in very concrete 
terms, this international authority would be mandated by the international 
community to assume jurisdiction as a trustee for all countries over the 
oceans and ocean floor with wide powers to regulate, supervise, and 
control all activities on or under the ocean and on the ocean floor.35 It was 
this aspect of the common heritage of mankind that was very especially 
important to Pardo, namely the international management of the deep 
seabed resources in the interests of all mankind. As we shall see, although 
the origin of the common heritage of mankind can be traced back to 
natural law and the ethic of stewardship, the international governance of 
the common heritage by and for all mankind was a new element which 
Pardo introduced and, in so doing, challenged the traditional schemes of 
sovereignty and freedom.  
As Arvid Pardo had wisely predicted, many UN member states did not 
share his concerns about the future of the seabed. The more industrialized 
member states were also reluctant to give up the opportunity given to 
them by Grotius’ laissez faire attitude in the high seas to appropriate 
for themselves the resources of the deep seabed and ocean floor. As a 
matter of fact, by the time Pardo’s idea of common heritage of mankind 
was made the subject of international law with the United Nations Law 
34 Bovenberg, 57.
35 Address by Pardo to the 22nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (1967), 
Official Records of the General Assembly,  22nd Session, Agenda Item 92, Document 
A/6695.  
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of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) of 1982,36 much of what Pardo had 
wanted to achieve with the concept of common heritage of mankind, 
as he understood it, had been left out of the final draft. The original 
formulation of the concept, as envisaged by Pardo, is to be found in the 
Draft Ocean Space Treaty that was submitted by Malta as a working paper 
for discussion purposes.37 For example, whereas in the original Maltese 
proposal, all the natural resources, living or non-living, existing beyond 
the 200-mile limit were to be managed by an international institution so 
as to ensure the equitable sharing by all states of the benefits derived from 
the exploitation of these resources, UNCLOS restricted the application of 
the concept of common heritage of mankind solely to mineral resources.38 
Again, whereas in the Maltese draft, within the 200-mile limit, coastal 
states were obliged to make contributions to the international community 
in exchange for the financial benefits derived from the extension of their 
rights on the resources contained within the given area under their control, 
UNCLOS required coastal states to make a contribution only in relation 
to the exploitation of non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 
the 200-mile limit.39
Still, many developed countries refused to sign the convention, 
citing as their main reason for not endorsing it the kind of governance 
that was envisaged under the common heritage of mankind regime that 
would, according to them, discourage mining activities by individual 
states and the private sector. 
While addressing the legal subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, on 10 March 1969, 
Pardo declared:
Many, I know, consider me a prophet of doom and gloom because I have predicted that 
the present uncertain legal status of the seabed may lead to a comprehensive scramble 
by a few countries to appropriate for national purposes the land under the world’s seas 
and oceans …40
36 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations at its 48th Session on 28 July 1994.  UNGA Res. 48/263.
37 Pardo, The Common Heritage of Mankind, 381–480.
38 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 10 December 
1982, Article 133.
39 Ibid., Article 82.
40 Pardo, The Common Heritage of Mankind, 70.
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Pardo was aware that with the development of sophisticated 
technology, the developed states had acquired the means to exploit the 
common spaces and, by employing the Roman concept of res communis, 
were free to share the spoils of their exploits among themselves. As a 
result, the gap between the rich countries of the North and the poor 
ones of the South was bound to continue to widen in favour of the 
more technologically advanced countries of the North. Another factor 
that was of concern to Pardo was the premise of abundance on which 
the Roman principles of acquisition were based. After the Second 
World War, the enlarging world community and the increasing world 
population made many resources scarce and as a result the traditional 
concepts of ownership and entitlement theories of justice had to be re-
examined.41 
So Pardo’s disappointment at the conclusion of the 1982 UNCLOS 
III event was no big surprise considering that the concept of common 
heritage of mankind became an economic watershed for promoting 
the free exploitation of common spaces under the guise of acting in 
the interests of all mankind. Addressing the Legal Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor in 1969, Pardo 
reminded the committee that, when the Maltese government submitted 
the proposal to declare the bounties of the deep sea the common heritage 
of mankind, he had made it abundantly clear that urgent action was 
needed because:
Need we recall that every month that passes brings the news of new encroachments 
in a domain that should remain intangible? If we do not proceed with speed and 
determination, both the area and particularly the resources that are to be explored and 
exploited for the benefit of all countries will be reduced almost to the vanishing point.42
Pardo’s call for urgency underscores the fact the common heritage 
of mankind is first and foremost a philosophical concept meant to 
encourage speculation about major changes in the world, such as the 
advent of technology and the scarcity of resources. It also has binding 
legal implications in so far as its provisions need to be applied by the 
world community in the interests of all mankind. Because of the legal 
41 Baslar, 45–6.
42 Pardo, The Common Heritage of Mankind,  90.
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implications of the concept of common heritage of mankind, Pardo has 
been recognized by some as a legal catalyst for making the concept 
of common heritage of mankind a legal principle of international 
law.43 Addressing the First Committee of the General Assembly on 29 
October 1968, Pardo made it clear that the concept of common heritage 
of mankind was not simply an alternative to the res communis regime 
but rather a new legal principle that, if intelligently construed, could 
save mankind from a whole plethora of problems in the future ranging 
from the natural environment to our own humanness:
For my delegation the common heritage concept is not a slogan, it is not one of a 
number of more or less desirable principles, but it is the very foundation of our work, 
the key that will unlock the door of the future.44  
To begin with, there were many ideological differences between 
developing and developed countries and these led to significant 
differences in the interpretation of the legal meaning of the concept 
of common heritage of mankind.45 These interpretations were never 
reconciled and, in fact, there has never been a serious juridical 
consideration of the concept of common heritage of mankind to clarify 
them. Although a number of UN General Assembly resolutions have 
tried to make the concept of common heritage of mankind a legal 
concept, the precise legal requirements of the concept have remained 
largely undefined. 
Another factor that influenced the debate within the General 
Assembly was the demand for change by developing countries 
embodied in the New International Economic Order,46 aimed at 
establishing a more equitable distribution of resources and income 
between developed and developing states. This goal was to be achieved 
by distributing the economic benefits derived from the exploitation of 
the deep seabed between all parties with the developed states sharing 
43 Barkenbus, 32.
44 Pardo, The Common Heritage of Mankind, 64.
45 Ram Prakash Anand, Legal Regime of the Deep Sea-Bed and the Developing Countries 
(Delhi, 1975), 205.
46 The NIEO was outlined at the 1964 UN Conference on Trade and Development by various 
declarations and was more comprehensively formulated in the ‘Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of a New International Economic Order’, GA res 320 1 (SW-V1), UN GAOR, 6th 
Special Session, 2229th Plenary Meeting, Supplement 1, UN Doc A/9599 (1974).
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their mining technology with the developing states. As a result, the 
developing countries saw the concept of common heritage of mankind 
as a means of rectifying their economic situation.47 
 With the Declaration of Principles, the General Assembly also 
convened the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea48 in 1973 
with the goal of creating a uniform codified regime to cover all aspects 
of the law of the sea, in particular the deep seabed.49 It was agreed that 
meetings would be informal, closed to the public and with no official 
records. Agreement was also to be by consensus with an informal no-
objection policy, often used in diplomatic negotiations, in order to 
avoid confrontation.50 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or 
UNCLOS, also called the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) or Law 
of the Sea Treaty (LOST) by its critics, took place from 1973 to 1982 
until finally, on 10 December 1982, the Convention was opened for 
signing in Montego Bay, Jamaica. Despite the controversy surrounding 
UNCLOS, its adoption has been hailed as one of the most significant 
achievements for international law. It has been referred to as a 
‘Constitution for the Oceans’,51 a ‘world order treaty’,52 and a ‘primary 
pillar of international law’.53 
The most controversial part of UNCLOS54 was Part XI with many of 
the developed states declaring, before the conclusion of the Conference, 
that they were not happy with the provisions related to seabed mining. 
Referring to the seabed as the ‘Area’ which is defined as ‘the seabed, ocean 
47 Boleslaw Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of the New International 
Economic Order, quoted in Edward Guntrip, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Ad-
equate Regime for Managing the Deep Seabed’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 
4:2 (2003), <http://www.mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/issues/archive/2003(2)/02Guntrip.pdf> 
[accessed on 10 May 2006] 
48 The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea held its first session in 1973 and worked 
for several months each year until it finally adopted the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea in 1982.
49 Ibid., 37.
50 Susan Peterson, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind?’, Environment, 22:1 (1980), 6–11.
51 Tommy T.B. Koh, ‘A Constitution of the Oceans’, in United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, ed. by Myron H. Nordquist (Dordrecht, 1985), 11–16.
52 Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will,  quoted 
in Peter S. Prows , ‘Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS 
Property Law’, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 
30 (2006), 1; < http://ssrn.com/abstract=918458> [accessed 15 June 2008].
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floor, and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’,55 
the Conference declared the ‘Area’ as being governed by the common 
heritage of mankind with the prohibition imposed on all states to claim 
or exercise ‘sovereignty or sovereign rights’ and natural or juridical 
persons ‘appropriating any part thereof’.56 Article 140 (1) provided that 
all activities must be undertaken for the benefit of mankind as a whole 
with special consideration to be given to the interests and needs of 
developing countries. That the use of the ‘Area’ was to be exclusively 
for peaceful purposes was provided for in Article 141, while Article 137 
(2) gave the International Seabed Authority jurisdiction to act on behalf 
of mankind as a whole in whom the resources of the ‘Area’ were vested. 
In the meantime, things did not augur well for Pardo as he was 
removed from his post as UN permanent representative when the Malta 
Labour Party won the general elections in 1971. At the first meeting of 
the convention in Caracas, in the summer of 1974, it was made known 
to the delegates that Malta was no longer interested in taking the lead 
with relation to the Law of the Sea initiatives. Unfortunately, Malta was 
no longer a protagonist in the Law of the Sea initiatives. Fr Peter has 
argued that ‘even today it can be seen that how Arvid Pardo’s draft was 
so much superior to what actually became law’.57
In order to put an end to this impasse, the General Assembly set about 
modifying the provisions of UNCLOS to which the developed nations 
had the greatest opposition which included the transfer of technology, 
the training of personnel, and the decision-making process of the 
International Seabed Authority. Consequently the General Assembly 
drafted the 1994 Implementation Agreement that was to be interpreted 
as a single instrument with Part XI of the UNCLOS Convention. In 
the case of any inconsistencies between the 1994 Agreement and Part 
XI, the 1994 Agreement was to prevail. Any subsequent ratifications of 
UNCLOS bound a state to the 1994 Agreement, while states could not 
accede to the 1994 Agreement without also adopting UNCLOS.58 
So it is fair to say that while the concept of common heritage of 
mankind, as originally envisaged by Pardo and with the backing of 
55 UNCLOS, 1982, Article 1 (1).
56 Ibid., Article 137 (1).
57 Daniel Massa, A73 PSI 25 August 2006.
58 Edward Guntrip, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime for Managing 
the Deep Seabed’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 4:2 (2003), 10.
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the developing countries of the G-77, symbolized the interests, needs, 
hopes, and aspirations of a large number of poor people who were 
ready to strive hard for a New International Economic Order, it ended 
by representing the interests of an increasingly dominating free-market 
economy that was the anti-thesis of the concept:  
While NIEO aspirations and the common heritage remain linked philosophically, the 
prospects for realizing either have dimmed markedly over the past three decades. It is 
true that the CHMP has emerged as a legitimate treaty-based principle of international 
law. That the UN Law of the Sea Convention entered into force in 1994 attests to as 
much. Even so, the CHMP still lacks acceptance as a customary legal norm sustained 
and substantiated by state practice.59 
Although it is fair to say that the concept of the common heritage 
of mankind has normative value under international treaty law in the 
terms provided by the Law of the Sea Convention, it has failed to attain 
normative value under customary international law because with the 
developed nations’ opposition to UNCLOS III and the subsequent 
compromise position of the 1994 Agreement adopted by the UN to get 
them on board, the concept was denied a free-standing, self-evident 
definition. As things now stand, its meaning is determined by the way 
it has been implemented in the deep seabed area in the Law of the Sea 
Convention.
That the concept of common heritage of mankind has attained 
normative value under international treaty law is a success in itself 
but the end result is not what Pardo had intended – it is a travesty of 
the Pardosian concept. Unhappy with the provisions related to the 
Exclusice Economic Zone which left the most valuable fish and mineral 
resources to the coastal states, Pardo observed that the common heritage 
of mankind had been whittled to ‘a few fish and a little seaweed’.60 In an 
article in the Wall Street Journal of 7 February 1983, President Julius 
Nyere of Tanzania expressed the feelings of the G-77:
I am saying, it is not right that the vast majority of the world’s population should be 
forced into the position of beggars, without dignity. In one world, as in one state, when 
59 Christopher Joynor, International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance 
(Lanham, MD, 2005), 244.
60 Center for War/Peace Studies Winter 1999/2000, No. 56.
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I am rich because you are poor, and I am poor because you are rich, the transfer of 
wealth from rich to poor is a matter of right; it is not an appropriate matter of charity. 
The objective must be the eradication of poverty and the establishment of a minimum 
standard of living for all people. This will involve its converse – a ceiling on wealth for 
individuals and nations, as well as deliberate action to transfer resources from the rich 
to the poor within and across national boundaries.61
Maybe the world could have been avoided the present crisis with 
Mediterranean migration if Pardo’s original proposals, inspired by 
Pope John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris, had been translated in concrete 
international political decisions that would have paved the way for a 
more equitable sharing of the natural resources of the seabed and ocean 
floor. We have come to a situation where more than half a million 
migrants are awaiting decisions on their asylum applications from the 
European Union’s 28 member states. Two thousand and five hundred 
migrants lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 alone. The 
political declaration of the Valletta Summit is a belated attempt to rectify 
the suffering, abuse, and unacceptable loss of life that is a shameful 
accusation of the political avarice that denied Pardo the opportunity to 
realize his dream to exploit the resources of the planet in the interests 
of all mankind. 
61 The Wall Street Journal, 7 February 1983, 9.
